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(1930).		Chafee	suggests	the	standard	for	judicial	review	of	a	private	association	as	(i) the rules and 
proceedings must not be contrary to natural justice; (2) the expulsion must have been in accordance with 




















































































































































































































































to	 the	 common	 law	 non‐reviewability	 of	 private	 association	 actions.	 This	
clause	can	be	upheld	as	coinciding	with	the	common	law	standard	disallowing	
court	 interference.	 We	 view	 its	 inclusion	 in	 the	 Major	 League	 Agreement	
merely	 as	 a	manifestation	of	 the	 intent	of	 the	 contracting	parties	 to	 insulate	







































































































































































































47	Title	9	U.S.C.	§10.		See	also	dictum	in	Wilko v. Swan,	346 U.S. 427 (1953) (overruled on other grounds 
in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) suggesting that “manifest 
disregard for the law” is a ground for overturning an arbitration decision.  See also Hall Street Assoc., 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,	552	U.S.	576	(2008),	holding	that	parties	may	not	expand	by	agreement	on	the	
standards	of	review	specified	in	the	FAA.	
48	See	Lisa	M.	Eaton,	Arbitration	Agreements	in	Labor	and	Employment	Contracts:	Well	Within	the	
Reach	of	the	FAA,	2002	J.	Disp.	Resol.	193,	212	(2002);	See	also	Michael	LeRoy,	Irreconciliable	
Differences:		The	Troubled	Marriage	of	Judicial	Review	Standards	under	the	Steelworkers	Trilogy	and	
the	Federal	Arbitration	Act,	2010	J.	Disp.	Resol.	89	(2010).	
There	is	some	debate	whether	the	FAA	was	intended	to	apply	to	labor	arbitration,	turning	
particularly	on	the	exclusionary	language	in	section	1	stating	“	.	.	.	nothing	herein	contained	shall	
apply	to	contracts	of	employment	of	seamen,	railroad	employees,	or	any	other	class	of	workers	
engaged	in	foreign	or	interstate	commerce.”				This	was	rejected	in	Circuit	City	Stores,	Inc.	v.	Adams,	
532	U.S.	105	(2001).				
49	29	U.S.C.	§	141,	Pub.	L.	No.	120,	61	Stat.	136	(1947).	
50	29	U.S.C.	§	185(a)	(“Suits	for	violation	of	contracts	between	an	employer	and	a	labor	organization	
representing	employees	in	an	industry.	.	.	,	or	between	any	such	labor	organizations,	may	be	brought	
in	any	district	court	of	the	United	States	having	jurisdiction	of	the	parties,	without	respect	to	the	
amount	in	controversy	or	without	regard	to	the	citizenship	of	the	parties.”)		
51	See	29	U.S.C.	§203(d):		“Final	adjustment	by	a	method	agreed	upon	by	the	parties	is	
declared	to	be	the	desirable	method	for	settlement	of	grievance	disputes	arising	over	the	application	
or	interpretation	of	an	existing	collective	bargaining	agreement.”	
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The	Supreme	Court’s	landmark	decisions	in	three	cases	commonly	referred	to	as	the	
Steelworkers	Trilogy	provides	the	authoritative	interpretation	of	these	provisions.		
The	Court	interpreted	the	LMRA	to	create	two	clear	doctrines.		First,	in	United	
Steelworkers	v.	Enterprise	Wheel	&	Car	Corp.,	the	Court	held	that	federal	judges	must	
defer	to	the	parties’	choice	of	alternative	dispute	resolution	procedures.52		Second,	
in	United	Steelworkers	v.	American	Manufacturing	Co.,53	the	Court	held	that,	where	
the	parties	have	chosen	impartial	arbitration,	federal	judges	must	enforce	awards	
that	“draw	their	essence	from	the	contract.”		This	second	holding	reflected	the	
reality	that	of	all	the	many	promises	parties	make	in	a	CBA,	the	most	important	one	
is	that	all	disputes	are	determined	by	an	arbitrator	of	their	choice,	and	not	by	
federal	judges.			
	
In	explaining	these	holdings,	the	Court	went	far	further	than	was	required	to	carry	
out	dutifully	the	congressional	declaration	to	effectuate	grievance	settlement	“by	a	
method	agreed	upon	by	the	parties.”54		It	discussed	at	length	the	many	benefits	to	
labor,	management,	and	the	general	public	of	the	impartial	arbitrator.55		An	arbitral	
tribunal	has	greater	expertise	than	federal	judges	in	interpreting	a	CBA	to	reflect	the	
parties’	agreement	and	to	facilitate	the	parties’	ongoing	relationship.			In	addition,	
labor	arbitration	promotes	labor	peace.		It	is	quicker	and	cheaper	than	federal	court	
litigation,	and	the	parties	are	more	likely	to	move	forward	constructively	after	a	
decision	by	an	arbitrator	of	their	choice.			As	Justice	Douglas	observed,	whereas	
arbitration	in	effect	substitutes	for	litigation	in	commercial	disputes,	in	labor	
disputes	it	often	substitutes	for	strikes	and	lockouts.56		
	
These	standards	are	premised	on	a	fundamental	policy	assumption	concerning	the	
independence,	neutrality	and	expertise	of	the	arbitrator.57		For	example,	Justice	
Douglas	states	in	the	Enterprise	Wheel	opinion:			
																																																								
52	363	U.S.	593	(1960)	(reversing	lower	court’s	refusal	to	defer	to	arbitrator	regarding	a	non‐
meritorious	claim).	
53	363	U.S.	564	(1960)	(reversing	lower	court’s	set‐aside	of	an	arbitral	award	because	of	its	
disagreement	with	the	merits	of	the	arbitrator’s	decision).	
54	29	U.S.C.	§	173	(1947).	
55	Warrior	&	Gulf,	363	U.S.	at	580‐82.	
56	Id.	at	578.	
57	None	of	the	three	Steelworkers	opinions	refers	to	the	Federal	Arbitration	Act,	nor	addresses	the	
question	whether	the	standards	under	section	10	under	that	act	are	congruent	with	the	subjective	
standards	articulated	in	Steelworkers.		The	two	cases	that	are	the	centerpiece	for	this	article,	Peterson	
and	Brady,	utilize	both	Steelworkers	and	the	FAA	interchangeably.		The	district	court	in	Peterson	
recognized	the	issue,	and	stated:			
	
For	purposes	of	this	case,	the	standard	of	review	under	the	LMRA	and	the	FAA	is	the	same.	
Courts	give	decisions	by	labor	arbitrators	“substantial	deference.”	“The	federal	labor	laws	
‘reflect	a	decided	preference	for	private	settlement	of	labor	disputes.’	”	Therefore,	“as	long	as	
the	arbitrator	is	even	arguably	construing	or	applying	the	[CBA]	and	acting	within	the	scope	of	
his	authority,	that	a	court	is	convinced	he	committed	serious	error	does	not	suffice	to	overturn	
his	decision.”		
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When	an	arbitrator	is	commissioned	to	interpret	and	apply	the	collective	
bargaining	agreement,	he	is	to	bring	his	informed	judgment	to	bear	in	order	to	
reach	a	fair	solution	of	a	problem.	This	is	especially	true	when	it	comes	to	
formulating	remedies.	There	the	need	is	for	flexibility	in	meeting	a	wide	
variety	of	situations.	The	draftsmen	may	never	have	thought	of	what	specific	
remedy	should	be	awarded	to	meet	a	particular	contingency.58	
	
To	implement	this	rationale,	the	Court	adopted	a	clear	statement	rule	to	enforce	the	
first	of	their	clear	doctrines	established	in	Warrior	&	Gulf:	arbitration	is	enforced,	
unless	the	parties	“evince	a	most	forceful	evidence	of	a	purpose	to	exclude”	the	
dispute	from	arbitration.”59			The	Court’s	adoption	of	this	clear	statement	rule	is	
important.			This	holding	is	not	consistent	with	a	strict	and	literal	reading	of	section	
203(d).			Consider	a	CBA	that	contains	ambiguous	language	suggesting	that	certain	
disputes	may	not	be	subject	to	arbitration.		Literally,	the	statutory	command	for	a	
federal	judge	to	implement	the	method	of	dispute	resolution	“agreed	to	by	the	
parties”	would	require	the	judge,	in	cases	of	ambiguous	text,	to	explore	other	
evidence	of	the	parties’	intent,	and	enforce	the	method	which	the	judge	determines	
is	most	probably	the	parties’	choice.			However,	Steelworkers	Trilogy	instead	
instructs	judges	to	forego	this	inquiry	and	find	a	matter	to	be	arbitrable	unless	the	
parties	have	clearly	stated	that	it	is	not.	
	
To	further	the	second	clear	doctrine,	established	in	Enterprise	Wheel	&	Car	Co.,	the	
Court	held	that	judicial	challenges	to	arbitral	awards	would	be	narrowly	
circumscribed.		To	secure	judicial	relief,	parties	would	need	to	demonstrate	clear	
bias,	fundamental	procedural	unfairness,	or	that	the	award	disregarded	the	
“essence”	of	the	parties’	collective	bargain	in	favor	of	the	arbitrator’s	“own	brand	of	
																																																																																																																																																																					
National	Football	League	Player’s	Ass’n	v.	National	Football	League,	88	F.Supp.	3d	1084,	1089	(D.	
Minn.	2015).				This	position	is	consistent	with	Oxford	Health	Systems	v.	Sutter,	133	S.Ct.	2064		(2013)	
which	suggests	the	standards	under	both	are	essentially	the	same,	even	in	a	non‐labor	arbitration:	
“Here,	Oxford	invokes	§	10(a)(4)	of	the	Act,	which	authorizes	a	federal	court	to	set	aside	an	arbitral	
award	“where	the	arbitrator[	]	exceeded	[his]	powers.”	A	party	seeking	relief	under	that	provision	
bears	a	heavy	burden.“It	is	not	enough	...	to	show	that	the	[arbitrator]	committed	an	error—or	even	a	
serious	error.”	Id.	at	2068,	quoting	Stolt–Nielsen	S.A.	v.	Animal	Feeds	International	Corp.,	559	U.S.	
662,	671(2010).		Because	the	parties	“bargained	for	the	arbitrator's	construction	of	their	agreement,”	
an	arbitral	decision	“even	arguably	construing	or	applying	the	contract”	must	stand,	regardless	of	a	
court's	view	of	its	(de)merits.	“		Oxford	Health,	133	S.Ct.	at	2068.			Only	if		the	arbitrator	acts	outside	
the	scope	of	his	contractually	delegated	authority	—issuing	an	award	that	“simply	reflect[s][his]	own	
notions	of	[economic]	justice”	rather	than	“draw[ing]	its	essence	from	the	contract”—may	a	court	
overturn	his	determination.			Id.	at	2068,		quoting	from	United	Paperworkers	Intern.	Union,	AFL‐CIO	
v,	Misco	Inc.,	484	U.S.	29,	38	(1987)	(“But	as	long	as	the	arbitrator	is	even	arguably	construing	or	
applying	the	contract	and	acting	within	the	scope	his	authority,	that	a	court	is	convinced	he	
committed	serious	error	does	not	suffice	to	overturn	his	decision.”)	The	Court	emphasized	that	“the	
sole	question	for	us	is	whether	the	arbitrator	(even	arguably)	interpreted	the	parties'	contract,	not	
whether	he	got	its	meaning	right	or	wrong.”		Oxford	Health,	133	S.Ct.	at	2068	
58	363	U.S.	at	597.	
59	Id.	at	585.	
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industrial	justice.”	60		Alas,	lower	courts	continue	to	ignore	the	Court’s	instructions	
to	restrain	their	impulse	to	second‐guess	impartial	arbitrators,61	even	though,	as	a	
court	of	appeals	correctly	interpreted	Steelworkers	Trilogy,	awards	cannot	be	set	
aside	because	the	arbitrator	“erred	in	interpreting	the	contract”	or	“clearly	erred”	or	
“grossly	erred,”	as	long	as	they	actually	interpreted	the	CBA.62	
	
C. Limits	to	freedom	of	contract			
	
A	fundamental	principle	of	labor	relations	law	is	that	an	employer	and	the	workers’	
chosen	union	should	be	able	to	fashion	an	agreement	on	wages,	hours,	and	working	
conditions	based	on	free	choice.	The	congressional	policy	promoting	regulation	of	
labor	through	collective	bargaining	is	facilitated,	logic	and	experience	suggest,	when	
parties	can	reach	their	own	bargains.		External	limits	on	free	contract	require	the	
parties	to	forego	the	most	efficient	bargain,	as	they	work	around	the	external	
limitation.			Because	this	increases	the	difficulty	of	agreement,	it	increases	the	
likelihood	of	impasse,	strikes	and	lockouts.	63					
	
However,	there	are	many	exceptions	to	this	important	foundational	principle.		
Union	and	management	cannot	agree	to	waive	rights	that	workers	have	under	
related	federal	employment	laws,	such	as	minimum	wages,	maximum	hours,	or	
occupational	health	and	safety	regulations.64			There	are	likely	many	examples	of	
industrial	bargains	that	would	be	facilitated	if	unions	could	waive	specific	safety	
standards,	that	might	not	necessarily	be	essential	to	their	particular	industry,	in	
return	for	other	favorable	management	concessions,	but	this	exception	precludes	
this	possibility.		Labor	law	also	precludes	unions	from	reaching	agreements	that	
breach	its	duty	of	fair	representation	to	all	workers	in	the	bargaining	unit.		
	
In	addition,	the	National	Labor	Relations	Board	(NLRB)	has	created	other	
exceptions,	in	the	exercise	of	its	delegated	discretion	to	effectuate	the	statutory	
requirement	that	parties	bargain	“in	good	faith.”			One	example	that	directly	limits	
freedom	of	contract	is	the	doctrine	regarding	creation	and	termination	of	multi‐
employer	bargaining.		The	Supreme	Court	has	upheld	Board	decisions	that,	when	
parties	have	voluntarily	agreed	to	commence	bargaining	on	a	multi‐employer	basis,	
neither	the	union	nor	individual	employers	can	withdraw	until	the	end	of	a	
“bargaining	cycle.”65			For	example,	in	the	leading	Board	precedent,	the	parties	were	
at	an	impasse	with	possible	industrial	action	and	the	union	sought	to	shift	
approaches	by	reaching	a	satisfactory	agreement	with	one	of	the	four	employers	
																																																								
60	363	U.S.	at	597.	
61	Robert	A.	Gorman	and	Matthew	W.	Finkin,	Labor	Law:	Unionization	and	Collective	Bargaining,	
§25.1,	817	(2d	ed.	2004).	
62	Hill	v.	Norfolk	&	West.	Ry.,	814	F.2d	1192,	1194	(7th	Cir.	1987).	
63	Wood	v.	NBA,	809	F.2d	954	(2d	Cir.	1987).	
64	See,	e.g.,	Allis‐Chalmers	Corp.	v.	Lueck,	471	U.S.	202,	211‐12	(1985)	(“Clearly,	§301	does	not	grant	
the	parties	to	a	[CBA]	the	ability	to	contract	for	what	is	illegal	under	state	law”).	
65	Charles	D.	Bonanno	Linen	Serv.	v.	NLRB,	454	U.S.	404	(1982),	citing	with	approval	Retail	
Associates,	Inc.,	120	N.	L.	R.	B.	388	(1958).	
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with	whom	they	were	negotiating.		The	Board	held	that	this	could	not	take	place	
until	an	appropriate	time	in	the	negotiation,	with	a	finding	that	the	union	
withdrawal	was	“a	sincere	abandonment,	with	relative	permanency,	of	the	
multiemployer	unit	and	the	embracement	of	a	different	course	of	bargaining	on	an	
individual‐employer	basis.”66		
	
In	sum,	although	labor	law	generally	seeks	to	fulfill	the	mutually‐agreed	desires	of	
labor	and	management,	there	are	multiple	exceptions	that	may	preclude	or	impair	
this	goal.		In	some	cases,	freedom	of	contract	is	explicitly	limited,	sometimes	it	is	
implicitly	limited,	and	in	other	cases,	such	as	the	Steelworkers	Trilogy,	freedom	of	
contract	is	supplemented	by	the	requirement	of	clear	statement.		If	the	parties	fail	to	
state	their	intent	clearly	with	respect	to	arbitration,	the	presumption	is	in	favor	of	
arbitration.	
	
D. Implication	of	Steelworkers:	The	independent	integrity	of	the	arbitral	
process.	
	
The	body	of	precedent	beginning	with	the	pathmaking	decisions	in	the	Steelworkers	
Trilogy	make	clear	that	judicial	interpretation	favoring	labor	arbitration	is	driven	by	
policies	that	the	Supreme	Court	favors	and	perceives	are	shared	by	Congress	and	
the	NLRB.		As	Professor	Roger	I.	Abrams	has	argued,	“freedom	to	operate	without	
legal	intrusion	but	with	considerable	legal	support	devolves	upon	the	participants		‐
‐	union,	management,	and	arbitrators	‐‐	a	responsibility	to	ensure	that	labor	
arbitration	effectuates	national	policy.”67			Because	federal	courts	will	enforce	no‐
strike	promises	in	collective	bargains,	and	will	not	substantively	review	the	
correctness	of	an	arbitral	award,	Abrams	observes	that,	with	“the	courts	and	the	
streets	now	foreclosed,	the	contract	rights	of	the	working	person	must	find	
protection	in	the	forum	of	arbitration	or	be	lost.”68		
	
In	Hines	v.	Anchor	Motor	Freight,	Inc.,	the	Supreme	Court	noted	that	a	final	and	
binding	arbitration	award	was	vulnerable	if	tainted	by	the	union’s	breach	of	its	duty	
of	fair	representation	to	its	workers.		If	"contractual	processes	have	been	seriously	
flawed,"	the	"integrity	of	the	arbitral	process"	has	been	undermined.			The	Court	
reasoned	that	although	Congress	“has	put	its	blessing	on	private	dispute	settlement	
arrangements	provided	in	collective	agreements,”	it	presumed	“that	contractual	
machinery	would	operate	within	some	minimum	levels	of	integrity."69			As	Abrams	
notes,	this	holding	means	that	the	“preferred	status	of	labor	arbitration	is	thus	not	
immutable.”70			He	notes	that	courts	can	easily	impose	core	principles	of	arbitral	
integrity	under	the	federal	common	law	of	labor	arbitration	established	by	section	
301	of	the	LMRA.71		
																																																								
66	Retail	Associates,	120	N.L.R.B.	at	394.	
67	Roger	I.	Abrams,	The	Integrity	of	the	Arbitral	Process,	76	Mich.	L.	Rev.	231,	235	(1977).	
68	Id.	at	236.	
69	424	U.S.	554,	571	(1976).	
70	Abrams,	supra	note	__,	at	235.			
71	Id.	at	263.	
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The	Court	clearly	favors	arbitration	for	reasons	other	than	a	commitment	to	laissez	
faire	freedom	of	contract.		A	libertarian	approach	would	overturn	the	common	law	
entirely	and	permit	parties	to	simply	waive	access	to	courts	in	lieu	of	impartial	
arbitration.		Such	an	approach	would	direct	courts	to	enforce	the	apparent	intent	of	
the	parties,	rather	than	presuming	that	the	parties	intended	to	resolve	disputes	
before	an	impartial	arbitrator	absent	clear	evidence	to	the	contrary.		Rather,	
Steelworkers	Trilogy	articulates	the	substantive	values	of	independent	arbitration	
that	warrant	legislative,	administrative,	and	judicial	support.		These	values	include	
the	fact	that	the	arbitrator,	as	the	chosen	instrument	of	the	parties,	is	assumed	to	be	
controlled	by	their	agreement	and	no	other	forces.			The	Court	recognized	that	goals	
of	collective	bargaining	and	labor	peace	are	served	when	union	and	management	
can	rely	on	an	arbitrator’s	“informed	practical	solution	of	a	dispute	they	could	not	
resolve	themselves.”	72			Another	significant	value	of	independent	arbitration	is	that	
parties	tend	to	view	the	totality	of	arbitral	decisions	and	acceptably	based	on	the	
terms	to	which	they	agreed.		
	
Of	course,	parties	often	take	advantage	of	the	primacy	of	voluntary	bargaining	to	
withdraw	a	matter	from	impartial	arbitration,	using	clear	language	to	do	so.		A	
common	practice	is	to	make	it	clear	that	a	matter	otherwise	subject	to	arbitration	
would	instead	be	reserved	as	a	matter	of	management	discretion	(or,	in	certain	
context,	union	discretion).			Occasionally,	in	an	extreme	form	of	Justice	Brandeis’	
insight	that	it	is	more	important	for	a	matter	to	be	settled	than	settled	correctly,73	
unsuccessful	mediation	efforts	conclude	with	a	coin	flip.			In	some	contexts,	
recognizing	the	primacy	of	the	overall	labor	relationship	results	in	a	specialized	
tribunal	equally	divided	between	management	and	labor,	who	are	expected	to	
resolve	multiple	industrial	disputes	through	bargaining	and	accommodation.74		
	
Policies	supporting	freedom	of	contract	permit	parties	to	a	collective	bargain,	if	they	
so	choose,	to	reject	these	general	principles	and	to	resolve	disputes	by	means	other	
than	impartial	arbitration.		But	because	impartial	arbitration	serves	these	worthy	
values,	the	parties	must	do	so	clearly	and	unequivocally.	
	
IV.	THE	ROLE	OF	CLEAR	STATEMENT	IN	SPORTS	ARBITRATION	
	
A	sports	arbitral	award	transformed	both	baseball,	and	eventually	modern	labor	
relations	in	sports,	by	ending	a	decades‐long	agreement	among	baseball	owners	not	
to	compete	for	the	services	of	players	at	the	expiration	of	their	contract.			Both	the	
decision	by	a	veteran	arbitrator	and	the	limited	judicial	review	of	that	decision	by	
federal	courts	demonstrate	the	role	that	clear	statement	rules	serve	in	labor	
relations.		The	conclusion	is	inescapable	that	these	rules	largely	preserve	the	ability	
																																																								
72	Id.	at	236.	
73	Burnet	v.	Coronado	Oil	&	Gas	Co.,	285	U.S.	393,	406	(1932)	(Brandeis,	J.,	dissenting).	
74	My	thanks	to	Professor	Paul	Whitehead	for	these	examples	from	his	experience	as	General	Counsel	
to	the	United	Steelworkers	of	America.	
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of	collective	bargaining	participants	to	craft	results	they	want.		However,	judicially‐
created	rules	of	clear	statement	allow	judges	to	favor	certain	results	and	disfavor	
others.	
	
In	Messersmith/McNally,75	the	arbitrator	interpreted	the	collectively	bargained	
uniform	player	contract	‐‐	which	explicitly	stated	the	Club	“may	renew	this	contract	
for	the	period	of	one	year	on	the	same	terms”	–	to	preclude	the	repeated	exercise	of	
this	renewal	right.			As	a	result,	after	one	year,	the	player	was	completely	free	to	
receive	competing	bids	from	other	baseball	clubs.		
		
This	radical	departure	from	past	practice	would	not	have	been	achieved	had	the	
arbitrator	relied	on	techniques	of	contract	interpretation	primarily	designed	to	
achieve	the	most	likely	intent	of	the	parties.		The	literal	language	supported	the	
owners’	interpretation	that	the	right	could	be	perpetually	exercised	by	the	club.		
Prior	practice	suggested	that	the	parties	understood	the	contract	to	permit	
perpetual	renewals,	as	evidenced	by	antitrust	litigation	funded	by	the	players’	
association	that	had	challenged	what	was	alleged	as	an	owners’	agreement	to	
refrain	from	competing	for	player	services	perpetually.76		Assuming	(likely	
correctly)	that	the	negotiating	parties	were	familiar	with	the	interpretive	precepts	
established	by	the	Restatement	of	Contracts,77	the	arbitrator	could	have	found,	
alternatively,	that	even	if	the	parties	attached	different	meanings	to	a	term,	the	term	
should	be	construed	in	accordance	with	the	meaning	attached	by	the	owners,	
because	at	the	time	the	agreement	was	made,	the	owners	did	not	know	the	players	
believed	that	the	term	permitted	free	agency	after	one	renewal	year,	whilst	the	
players	knew	that	the	owners	interpreted	the	term	as	granting	a	perpetual	right	of	
renewal.		
	
Instead,	the	arbitral	decision	was	based	on	a	principal	of	clear	statement.		The	
arbitrator	relied	on	an	interpretive	canon	requiring	perpetual	options	to	be	
express.78			The	result	could	also	have	been	justified	based	on	a	related	clear	
statement	canon,	contra	preferendum,	that	requires	ambiguities	to	be	interpreted	
against	the	party	who	drafted	them.79		
	
Because	of	the	major	implications	of	this	pathbreaking	decision,	the	owners	sought	
a	federal	court	judgment	vacating	the	arbitral	award	in	Kansas	City	Royals	v.	MLB	
Players	Ass’n.80			Aware	that	Steelworkers	Trilogy	precludes	careful	judicial	review	of	
an	arbitrator’s	contract	interpretation,	management	counsel	surely	realized	that	
																																																								
75	Messersmith/McNallyGrievance	Arbitration,	66	Labor	Arbitration	Reporter	101(1975).	
76	Flood	v.	Kuhn,	407	U.S.	258	(1972).	
77	Rest.	of	Contracts	§201	(Am.	Law.	Inst.	1981)	.	
78	Messersmith,	66	Lab.	Arb.	R.	at	113‐14.	
79	Rest.	(2d)	of	Contracts,	§206.		For	a	critique	of	these	techniques	in	the	context	of	interpreting	a	
collective	bargaining	agreement	between	two	sophisticated	parties,	see	Roger	I.	Abrams,	Liberation	
Arbitration:	The	Baseball	Reserve	Clause	Case,	in	Proceedings	of	the	55th	Annual	Meeting	of	the	
National	Academy	of	Arbitrators		192	(2002).	
80		532	F.2d	615	(1976).	
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they	would	be	unlikely	to	persuade	a	federal	judge	to	accept	their	challenge	as	a	
matter	of	contract	law	to	the	arbitrator’s	judgment	that	a	rule	of	clear	statement	
applied	to	perpetual	contracts,	and	that	instead	he	should	have	relied	on	the	literal	
meaning	of	the	text	or	their	contested	view	of	the	parties’	intent.		Indeed,	the	court	
of	appeals	had	little	difficulty	upholding	this	aspect	of	the	award.		
	
A	more	significant	challenge	was	the	owners’	argument	that	the	dispute	was	not	
arbitrable.		The	collective	bargaining	agreement	explicitly	stated	that	it	did	“not	deal	
with	the	reserve	system”	featuring	no	competition	for	player	services.			The	court	
rejected	this	argument	as	well,	but	reviewed	the	question	of	arbitrability	de	novo.			
However,	in	upholding	the	arbitrability	of	the	grievance	filed	by	players	Andy	
Messersmith	and	Dave	McNally,	the	court	of	appeals’	review	was	not	based	on	
whether	it	was	more	probable	than	not	that	the	parties	intended	to	arbitrate.		
Rather,	applying	Steelworkers	Trilogy,	the	applicable	test	is	whether	“the	record	
evinces	the	most	forceful	evidence	of	a	purpose	to	exclude	the	grievances	from	
arbitration.”81		
	
In	sum,	the	court	refused	to	determine	for	itself	whether,	as	the	LMRA	literally	
requires,	arbitration	was	the	final	method	of	dispute	resolution	of	the	parties.		
Rather,	“what	a	reasonable	party	might	be	expected	to	do	cannot	take	precedence	of	
what	the	parties	actually	provided	for	in	their	collective	bargaining	agreement.”82			
Because	the	agreement	did	not	explicitly	demonstrate	a	clear	intent	to	remove	the	
matter	from	arbitration,	and	because	federal	courts	believe	that	independent	
arbitration	serves	many	benefits,	the	courts	would	enforce	the	arbitral	award.	
	
V.	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	OF	SPORTS	COMMISSIONER	DISCIPLINE	IN	THE	
ABSENCE	OF	INDEPENDENT	ARBITRATION	
	
The	foregoing	analysis	yields	the	following	conclusions	about	the	proper	scope	of	
judicial	review	of	disputes	between	unionized	players	and	the	league	commissioner	
over	disciplinary	issues.		Each	sports	league’s	collective	bargaining	agreement	has	
provisions	for	impartial	grievance	arbitration.		Absent	clear	intent	to	exclude	a	
matter	from	impartial	arbitration,	the	individual(s)	chosen	by	the	parties	for	this	
purpose	has	jurisdiction,	and	the	resulting	arbitral	award	is	subject	to	deferential	
judicial	review	under	the	FAA	and	Steelworkers	Trilogy	standards,	subject	to	vacatur	
only	if	judges	are	persuaded	that	the	award	did	not	draw	its	essence	from	the	
agreement	but	was	instead	the	arbitrator’s	personal	imposition	of	industrial	justice.			
Moreover,	absent	clear	and	express	language,	sports	agreements	should	not	be	read	
to	give	players	significantly	fewer	rights	than	non‐unionized	league	employees	and	
owners.83	
																																																								
81	Id.	at	621.	
82	Id.	at	630.	
83	A	decision	that	superficially	bears	on	this	analysis	is	State	ex	rel.	Hewitt	v.	Kerr,	120	Fair	Empl.	
Prac.	Cas.	(BNA)	1086	(Mo.	Ct.	App.	2013).		The	court	held	that	a	provision	in	the	contract	between	
the	St.	Louis	Rams	and	its	non‐union	equipment	manager,	which	provided	that	all	disputes	would	be	
resolved	by	the	Commissioner,	was	unconscionable	because	of	the	Commissioner’s	bias	as	an	
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Each	sports	leagues’	CBA,	to	varying	degrees,	does	explicitly	demonstrate	a	clear	
intent	that	certain	matters	are	not	subject	to	impartial	arbitration,	but	reserved	for	
the	commissioner	or	his	designee.		The	NFL	CBA,	similar	to	the	other	professional	
sports,	provides	that	disputes	between	the	parties	“will	be	resolved	exclusively”	by	
a	procedure	of	impartial	arbitration,	“except	wherever	another	method	of	dispute	
resolution	is	set	forth	elsewhere	in	this	Agreement.”84		However,	pursuant	to	that	
last	proviso,	the	2011	CBA	provides	in	Article	46	that	any	dispute	involving	a	fine	or	
suspension	imposed	upon	a	player	for	on‐field	conduct,	or,	more	broadly,	“for	
conduct	detrimental	to	the	integrity	of,	or	public	confidence	in,	the	game	of	
professional	football,”	is	expressly	withdrawn	from	impartial	arbitration.85			
	
In	lieu	of	recourse	to	an	independent	arbitrator	to	review	the	discipline,	the	NFLPA	
agreed	that	Commissioner	discipline	imposed	under	Article	46	is	instead	reviewed	
by	an	appeal	to	the	Commissioner,	who	would	designate	a	hearing	officer.		There	is	
no	bar	to	the	Commissioner	serving	as	the	hearing	officer,	and	in	fact	that	procedure	
is	most	often	the	practice.	Consequently,	in	many	cases	the	Commissioner	appoints	
himself	as	the	hearing	officer	to	review	his	own	decision,	with	the	power	to	“render	
a	written	decision	which	will	constitute	full,	final	and	complete	disposition	of	the	
dispute	and	will	be	binding”	upon	all	parties.		No	legal	standard	for	the	“hearing	
officer’s”	review	of	the	initial	discipline	is	stated	in	Article	46.86	
	
Article	46	as	written	demonstrates	an	intent	to	exclude	“best	interest”	player	
discipline	from	independent	arbitration.		This	election	is	not	unusual;	many	labor	
agreements	choose	to	designate	certain	matters	as	within	management’s	
prerogative,	or	to	delegate	certain	types	of	grievances	to	management/labor	
committees,	or	other	internally	structured	non‐independent	hearing	committees.		
While	these	procedures	are	appropriate	and	common,	they	should	not	be	
mistakenly	lumped	with	decisions	made	by	independent	arbitrators.87		
																																																																																																																																																																					
employee	of	the	Rams	and	other	clubs.		However,	more	careful	analysis	reveals	that	Kerr	does	not	
really	address	the	same	issues	we	discuss	in	this	Article.		First,	the	issue	goes	to	the	Commissioner’s	
power	to	arbitrate	disputes	between	clubs	and	employees,	not	the	Commissioner’s	unique	power	to	
discipline	misconduct	detrimental	to	the	“best	interests”	of	football.		Second,	the	court	emphasized,	in	
concluding	the	provision	was	unconscionable,	that	the	contract	term	was	presented	in	take‐it‐or‐
leave‐it	fashion	to	an	unsophisticated	single	employee.		The	court’s	reasoning	makes	it	clear	that	the	
court’s	conclusion	would	not	necessarily	apply	to	a	reasoned	decision	by	a	highly	sophisticated	
union,	with	a	veteran	executive	director	and	skilled	legal	counsel,	to	accept	the	Commissioner’s	
authority	to	impose	discipline	without	resort	to	an	independent	arbitrator.			
84	NFL	CBA,	Art.	43,	sec.	1.	
85	NFL	CBA,	Art.	46,	sec.	1(a).	
86	In	the	Ray	Rice	arbitration,	supra	note	__,	an	independent	arbitrator	was	appointed	as	the	hearing	
officer.		She	noted	the	lack	of	a	review	standard	in	Article	46.		Reasoning	from	the	other	sections	of	
the	CBA	that	did	utilize	an	arbitrator,	she	determined	that	her	standard	of	review,	sitting	in	the	place	
of	the	Commissioner,	should	be	“arbitrary	and	capricious,”	as	opposed	to	“just	cause”.				See	also	text	
accompanying	notes	__‐__,	infra.	
87	Consistent	with	the	parties’	intent,	the	NFL‐CBA	does	not	refer	to	the	Article	46	process	as	an	
“arbitration,”	but	instead	describes	the	process	of	review	by	a	hearing	officer	as	an	“appeal.”	Further,	
the	Article’s	language	does	not	apply	the	label	of	“arbitrator”	to	the	hearing	officer.			
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Under	our	system	of	labor	law	encouraging	voluntary	agreement	by	the	parties,	this	
negotiated	departure	from	the	reliance	on	an	independent	arbitrator	utilized	
throughout	the	rest	of	the	CBA	is	totally	appropriate.		The	negotiation	clearly	
reflects	the	union’s	judgment	that	other	CBA	provisions	are	more	meaningful	to	
their	constituency.88			The	parties	are	also	free	to	agree	on	an	express	standard	of	
review	of	the	Commissioner’s	decision	through	careful	and	appropriate	drafting	of	
the	CBA’s	text.		However,	in	lieu	of	such	drafting,	our	concern	is	that	the	NFLPA,	the	
NFL	and	the	courts	consistently	utilize	the	traditional	review	standard	designed	for	
an	independent	arbitrator	articulated	under	the	FAA	and	the	LMRA.		These	
workable	and	effective	standards	are	premised	on	the	independence	and	expertise	
of	a	neutral	arbitator.		They	are	ill‐suited	for	reviewing	the	unique	“best	interest”	
decisions	of	a	sports	league	commissioner.	
	
The	NFL’s	Article	46	procedure	introduces	no	independent	center	of	review	that	is	
fundamental	to	the	Steelworkers’	policy.	The	Article	46	discipline	is	imposed	by	the	
Commissioner,	and	appealed	to	the	Commissioner.		This	form	of	governance	
effectively	restores	the	power	the	Commissioner	originally	enjoyed	over	all	
stakeholders	under	private	association	law,	and	that	has	remained	vested	in	the	
Commissioner	with	regard	to	owners	and	employees	not	covered	by	the	union	CBA.		
Because,	with	regard	to	actions	taken	pursuant	to	Article	46,	the	NFL	more	
resembles	a	private	association,	the	appropriate	standard	of	judicial	review	likewise	
should	be	that	of	a	private	association.		
	
Consider	the	“Deflategate”	scandal	where	the	NFL	Commissioner	found	two	club	
employees	had	conspired	with	star	quarterback	Tom	Brady	to	illegally	deflate	
footballs;89	suppose	instead	that	Brady	was	not	implicated,	but	instead	the	
Commissioner	found	that	the	employees	had	conspired	with	Patriots	club	President	
Jonathan	Kraft	(son	of	owner	Robert	Kraft)?		As	noted	above,	without	the	overlay	of	
labor	law,	the	Commissioner’s	authority	to	impose	discipline	on	anyone	is	subject	to	
judicial	review	under	the	law	of	private	association.			Under	cases	like	Turner	v.	
Kuhn,	Kraft	could	have	challenged	any	punishment	on	grounds	that	the	decision	was	
arbitrary	and	capricious,	that	it	was	contrary	to	existing	NFL	rules,	or	exceeded	the	
Commissioner’s	authority.		The	only	difference,	in	our	view,	between	Kraft	and	
Brady	is	that	Brady’s	claim	as	a	union	worker	would	be	filed	in	federal	court	and	
determined	under	the	federal	common	law,	while	Kraft’s	claim	would	be	
determined	by	the	applicable	state	common	law	of	private	associations.		
	
To	be	sure,	sports	leagues	and	their	players	could	agree	that	unionized	workers	
waive	rights	they	would	otherwise	have	at	common	law	to	challenge	the	
Commissioner	disciplinary	decisions	(presumably	in	return	for	other	concessions	
																																																								
88	The	relevant	language	of	Article	46	is	consistent	with	the	language	of	previous	NFL	CBAs	going	
back	to	the	first	1968	CBA	dealing	with	Commissioner	discipline	under	the	“best	interest”	clause.	
See	note	___,	supra.			
89	The	facts	are	recounted	in	Brady,	supra,	820	F.3d	at	532‐533.	
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and	protections	in	the	CBA).		Indeed,	if	they	so	chose,	they	could	add	the	following	
hypothetical	provision:	
	
The	parties	agree	that	the	Commissioner’s	decision	shall	be	final	with	regard	
to	any	determination	arising	under	this	section	of	the	agreement,	and	
expressly	state	their	intent	that	the	matter	shall	not	be	subject	to	grievance	by	
the	impartial	arbitrator.			Any	judicial	review	of	the	Commissioner’s	decision	
shall	be	limited	to	determining	whether	the	discipline	drew	its	essence	from	
the	authority	delegated	herein	to	the	Commissioner,	and	the	decision	shall	
only	be	overturned	if	a	court	determines	that	the	Commissioner	breached	his	
obligation	under	this	agreement	and	instead	imposed	his	own	industrial	brand	
of	justice.90	
	
Although	such	a	provision	is	permitted,	it	should	not	be	encouraged.		Judges	are	too	
tempted	to	distort	the	Steelworkers	Trilogy	standard,	designed	properly	for	
impartial	arbitration,	when	faced	with	a	review	by	a	management	official.		Nor	are	
there	sound	reasons	of	policy	why,	absent	express	language,	the	well‐developed	
common	law	of	private	association	that	applies	to	owners	and	non‐union	employees	
should	not	also	apply	to	decisions	by	Commissioners	applicable	to	players.			
	
For	these	reasons,	the	same	technique	of	clear	statement	that	led	the	Supreme	Court	
to	presume	that	parties	intend	disputes	to	be	arbitrated	should	be	used	to	presume	
that	unionized	employees	(i.e.,	NFL	players)	do	not	have	fewer	rights	for	judicial	
review	of	discipline	than	their	non‐union	colleagues	in	the	workplace.		
	
We	acknowledge	that,	in	many	cases,	judicial	review	under	the	law	of	private	
associations	and	judicial	review	under	the	Steelworkers	Trilogy	will	yield	similar	
results.		Well‐reasoned	judgments	by	a	sports	league	commissioner	that	are	faithful	
to	the	league’s	rules	and	precedents	will	be	upheld	under	either	standard.		Decisions	
that	impose	his	personal	brand	of	industrial	justice	rather	than	drawing	their	
essence	from	the	CBA	(subject	to	vacatur	under	labor	arbitration	rules)	are	likely	to	
be	found	arbitrary	or	contrary	to	league	rules	(subject	to	invalidation	under	private	
association	doctrine).		Moreover,	judges	who	themselves	are	tempted	to	impose	
their	own	brand	of	justice	can	easily	fulfill	their	formal	responsibilities	to	follow	
doctrine	by	pronouncing	the	correct	labels.		Thus,	even	though	precedents	applying	
Steelworkers	Trilogy	make	it	clear	that	an	arbitrator’s	decision	cannot	be	overturned	
because	in	the	reviewing	court’s	opinion	the	arbitrator	misinterpreted	the	CBA,91	a	
recent	court	of	appeals	vacated	an	award	because	the	arbitrator’s	misinterpretation	
of	“plain	meaning”	showed	that	the	award	did	not	draw	its	essence	from	the	
contract.92		Alternatively,	in	the	Finley	case	discussed	above,	if	the	court	of	appeals	
																																																								
	
91	Hill	v.	Norfolk	&	W.	Ry.	Co.,	814	F.2d	1192,	1194‐95	(7th	Cir.	1987).			
92	United	States	Soccer	Fed'n,	Inc.	v.	United	States	Nat'l	Soccer	Team	Players	Ass'n,	
838	F.3d	826	(7th	Cir.	2016).	
22	
	
felt	that	the	Commissioner’s	act	was	unjust,	they	could	have	decided	it	was	based	on	
malicious	animosity,	and	reversed	on	that	ground.			
	
We	therefore	do	not	claim	that	any	particular	decision	necessarily	would	have	been	
decided	differently	had	the	correct	standard	been	used.		However,	the	split	panel	
decision	Brady	suggests	that	the	issues	would	have	been	considered	and	debated	in	
a	different	way,	and	the	NFLPA	might	well	have	prevailed	under	the	law	of	private	
associations.93	
	
Chief	Judge	Katzmann	dissented	in	Brady,	largely	over	the	Commissioner’s	failure	to	
reconcile	the	well‐established	and	relatively	minor	penalty	for	wide	receivers	using	
improper	“stickum”	to	give	them	an	advantage	in	catching	a	football	with	what	he	
perceived	was	a	similar	offense	in	deflating	a	football	to	give	a	quarterback	an	
advantage	in	passing	the	ball.		He	wrote:	
	
Precisely	because	of	the	severity	of	the	penalty,	one	would	have	expected	the	
Commissioner	to	at	least	fully	consider	other	alternative	and	collectively	
bargained‐for	penalties,	even	if	he	ultimately	rejected	them.	Indeed,	the	CBA	
encourages—though,	as	the	majority	observes,	does	not	strictly	require—the	
Commissioner	to	fully	explain	his	reasoning	by	mandating	that	he	issue	a	
written	decision	when	resolving	an	Article	46	appeal.	That	process	is	all	the	
more	important	when	the	disciplinary	action	is	novel	and	the	Commissioner's	
reasoning	is,	as	here,	far	from	obvious.	
	
Yet,	the	Commissioner	failed	to	even	mention,	let	alone	explain,	a	highly	
analogous	penalty,	an	omission	that	underscores	the	peculiar	nature	of	
Brady's	punishment.	The	League	prohibits	the	use	of	stickum,	a	substance	that	
enhances	a	player's	grip.	Under	a	collectively	bargained‐for	Schedule	of	Fines,	
a	violation	of	this	prohibition	warrants	an	$8,268	fine	in	the	absence	of	
aggravating	circumstances.	Given	that	both	the	use	of	stickum	and	the	
deflation	of	footballs	involve	attempts	at	improving	one's	grip	and	evading	the	
referees'	enforcement	of	the	rules,	this	would	seem	a	natural	starting	point	for	
assessing	Brady's	penalty.	Indeed,	the	League's	justification	for	prohibiting	
stickum—that	it	"affects	the	integrity	of	the	competition	and	can	give	a	team	
an	unfair	advantage,"	—is	nearly	identical	to	the	Commissioner's	explanation	
																																																								
93	In	Peterson,	the	other	major	recent	decision,	the	principal	ground	of	appeal	was	
that	the	Commissioner	imposed	a	policy	retroactively	by	issuing	more	severe	
discipline	than	he	had	in	prior	cases.		However,	the	designated	NFL	executive	
charged	with	hearing	the	appeal,	and	the	court	of	appeals,	both	recognized	that	the	
Commissioner	has	broad	discretion	to	increase	penalties	if	prior	penalties	were	
seen	as	ineffective.			.	Peterson,	831	F.3d	at	992.		Given	the	breadth	of	the	
Commissioner’s	best	interests	authority,	see	Milwaukee	American	Ass’n	v.	Landis,	49	
F.2d	298,	299	(N.D.	Ill.	1931)	(parties	intended	Commissioner	to	be	“proverbial	
pater	familias”),	it	would	appear	that	the	NFLPA	would	not	have	been	successful	had	
they	sought	to	challenge	Peterson’s	discipline	under	the	law	of	private	associations.	
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for	what	he	found	problematic	about	the	deflation—that	it	"reflects	an	
improper	effort	to	secure	a	competitive	advantage	in,	and	threatens	the	
integrity	of,	the	game."94	
	
An	impartial	expert	labor	arbitrator	is	not	bound	by	precedent	and	does	not	have	to	
explain	any	deviation	from	similar	cases.		That	is	because	it	is	the	arbitrator’s	
judgment	that	has	been	bargained	for	by	the	parties.		In	contrast,	under	the	law	of	
private	association,	those	charged	by	the	association’s	governing	documents	with	
internal	decision	making	are	obliged	to	both	follow	rules	and	do	so	in	a	way	that	is	
not	arbitrary.		The	law	of	private	associations	recognizes	that	non‐parties	may	be	
subject	to	association	rules,	and	judicial	review	to	ensure	consistent	rule	compliance	
is	therefore	appropriate.95		For	example,	in	Finley	the	court	of	appeals	took	note	that	
the	Commissioner	persuaded	them	that	previously	approved	cash	sales	of	players	
were	of	a	different	quality	and	magnitude	than	the	ones	disapproved	in	the	case	sub	
judice.		Applying	the	labor	arbitration	model,	in	contrast,	the	majority	in	Brady	
expressly	noted	that	the	CBA	did	not	require	the	“arbitrator”	to	explain	his	
reasoning.96		The	failure	to	explain	why	Brady’s	misconduct	was	so	much	more	
severe	may	well	have	persuaded	one	of	the	judges	in	the	majority	that	
Commissioner	Goodell’s	decision	was	not	consistent	with	league	rules,	even	if	his	
overall	judgment	“drew	its	essence”	from	the	CBA.			
	
Another	ground	for	appeal	in	Brady	was	the	NFLPA’s	claim	that	the	published	rules	
specified	that	first	offenses	for	equipment	violations	“will	result	in	fines.”97		It	
appears	likely	that	Judge	Parker’s	majority	decision	rejected	that	claim	on	the	
merits,	because	it	emphasized	that	the	rules	document	later	states	that	suspensions	
may	also	be	imposed	based	on	the	circumstances.98		However,	the	opinion	is	not	
clear	on	this	point:	it	goes	on	to	state	that	“even	if	other	readings	were	plausible,	the	
Commissioner's	interpretation	of	this	provision	as	allowing	for	a	suspension	would	
easily	withstand	judicial	scrutiny	because	his	interpretation	would	be	at	least	
"barely	colorable,"	which,	again,	is	all	that	the	law	requires.”99	This	seems	to	be	a	
correct	way	of	re‐wording	the	“draws	its	essence	from	the	contract”	standard	for	
labor	arbitrators.		However,	the	law	of	private	associations	would	not	likely	uphold	
an	official’s	unpersuasive	and	unjustified	interpretation	simply	because	it	was	
“barely	colorable.”	
	
A	final	significant	difference	between	judicial	review	under	the	Steelworkers	Trilogy	
and	the	law	of	private	association	concerns	the	appropriate	standard	of	review,	as	a	
matter	of	internal	NFL	“law,”	that	the	Commissioner	applies	in	reviewing	his	initial	
decision.		In	three	recent	internal	decisions	under	Article	46,	the	designated	hearing	
																																																								
94	Brady,	820	F.3d	at	552	
95	Gulf	South	Conference,	supra.		
96	Brady,	820	F.3d	at	540.	
97	Id.	at	539.	
98	Id.	
99	Id.	
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officers	used	three	different	standards.100	In	Bountygate,101	former	Commissioner	
Paul	Tagliabue,	acting	as	Hearing	Officer,	articulated	a	standard	of	“consistency	of	
treatment,	uniformity	of	standards	for	parties	similar	situated	and	patent	unfairness	
or	selectivity.”		In	Ray	Rice,102	retired	federal	judge	Barbara	Jones,	acting	as	Hearing	
Officer,	determined	that	the	union	had	the	burden	of	showing	that	the	initial	
discipline	was	“arbitrary	and	capricious.”		In	Peterson,	NFL	Labor	Relations	Vice	
President	Harold	Henderson,	acting	as	Hearing	Officer,	rejected	the	appeal	on	the	
ground	that	“the	player	has	not	demonstrated	that	the	process	and	procedures	
surrounding	his	discipline	were	not	fair	and	consistent.”103		The	law	of	private	
association	would	give	a	player	seeking	judicial	review	two	alternative	theories	to	
attack	the	Hearing	Officer’s	decision:	(1)	That	it	improperly	affirmed	an	initial	
disciplinary	decision	that	was	itself	arbitrary	and	capricious,	and	(2)	that	the	
Hearing	Officer	breached	league	rules	by	applying	a	standard	that	was	markedly	
different	from	pre‐existing	association	practice.		It	is	not	clear	that	there	is	a	marked	
difference	between	the	three	standards	recently	employed	(although	Tagliabue’s	
articulation	is	arguably	clearer	and	perhaps	worthy	of	emulation).		Consider	the	
possibility,	however,	that	a	subsequent	hearing	officer	read	the	Peterson	standard	
articulated	by	Henderson	narrowly,	to	provide	review	only	for	procedures,	and	not	
the	substance	of	the	initial	disciplinary	decision.		Under	the	law	of	private	
association,	we	believe	that	a	court	would	be	justified	in	overturning	a	decision	
where	the	Hearing	Officer	did	not	actually	determine	that	the	discipline	was	
consistent,	with	uniform	standards	for	parties	similarly	situated,	or	did	not	consider	
on	the	merits	a	player’s	claim	that	he	was	the	victim	of	patent	unfairness	or	
selectivity.		In	both	Brady	and	Peterson	(Rice	was	not	appealed),	the	appellate	courts	
disregarded	the	question	whether	the	“arbitrator”	applied	the	proper	standard	of	
review	for	the	hearing	officer	under	Article	46.		Absent	a	specific	clear	standard,	an	
impartial	and	expert	labor	arbitrator	selected	by	the	parties	to	resolve	disputes	is	
free	to	select	any	standard,	as	long	as	it	drew	its	essence	from	the	contract.		Under	
the	law	of	private	associations,	that	question	would	be	prominent	for	the	reviewing	
court.	
	
CONCLUSION	
	
For	nearly	six	decades,	federal	courts	have	worked	hard	to	develop	a	system	that	
facilitates	peaceful	resolution	of	industrial	disputes	through	the	designation	of	an	
impartial	expert	to	arbitrate	disputes.		To	achieve	this	goal	requires	judges	to	
engage	in	uncommon	self‐restraint,	refusing	to	step	in	even	when	they	perceive	a	
																																																								
100	Inferentially,	the	standard	is	less	rigorous	than	the	“just	cause”	standard	typically	used	by	
independent	arbitrators	to	review	disciplinary	matters.		NFL	CBA	Art.	42	provides	for	such	a	review	
of	club	discipline,	but	Art.	43(3)(b)	specifically	provides	that	any	club	discipline	is	preempted	by	
Commissioner	discipline	imposed	pursuant	to	Art.	46.	
101	Supra	note	__.	
102	Supra	note	__.	
103	See	letter	decision	from	Harold	Henderson	to	Jeffrey	L.	Kessler	and	Daniel	L.	Nash,	December	12,	
2014,	at	page	8,	copy	on	file	with	the	authors.	
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legally‐trained	tribune	has	erred	in	factual	findings	or	legal	conclusions.		At	the	
same	time,	federal	labor	law	promotes	industrial	harmony	by	allowing	unions	and	
employers	to	make	their	own	bargains,	including	the	removal	of	disputes	from	
impartial	arbitration.		However,	given	the	judicial	and	legislative	preference	for	
arbitration,	such	an	agreement	must	be	express.	
	
When	the	parties	do	expressly	agree	to	resolve	disputes	by	means	other	than	
impartial	labor	arbitration,	the	question	arises	as	to	the	appropriate	standard	of	
review	of	that	decision.		We	believe	that	the	appropriate	standard	is	the	common	
law	baseline	that	would	have	existed	were	the	employees	not	protected	by	a	
collective	bargaining	agreement.			Because	employees	involved	in	sports	leagues	
have	no	choice	but	to	subject	themselves	to	league	rules,	reviewing	courts	have	
examined	sports	league	decisions	under	the	law	of	private	associations,	and	have	
insisted	that	league	officials	taking	adverse	action	must	act	in	conformance	with	the	
authorized	powers,	consistently	with	league	rules,	and	the	decision	must	not	be	
arbitrary	or	capricious.			
	
Applying	the	standards	of	review	appropriate	for	an	expert	impartial	arbitrator	to	a	
management	decision	expressly	withdrawn	from	arbitration	is	not	appropriate.		It	
creates	the	anomalous	situation	where	a	non‐union	employee’s	common	law	rights	
might	exceed	those	of	a	unionized	worker.		More	significantly,	it	risks	distorting	the	
law	of	labor	arbitral	review,	because	of	judges’	inevitable	tendency	to	view	a	
management	decision	differently.		To	be	sure,	union	representatives	and	
management	executives	are	free	to	impose	whatever	standard	they	want,	regardless	
of	what	others	may	think,	but	if	they	are	going	to	adopt	a	standard	designed	for	
other	purposes,	they	should	have	to	do	so	expressly.		Absent	such	an	express	
incorporation	of	Steelworkers	Trilogy	language	into	a	standard	of	review	of	a	matter	
withdrawn	from	arbitration,	challenges	to	Commissioner’s	decisions	should	proceed	
to	federal	court	under	section	301	of	the	LMRA	under	the	common	law	standard	of	
the	law	of	private	associations.	
	
